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Corporate Environmental Initiatives in the Chinese Context:  
Performance Implications and Contextual Factors 
 
Abstract 
Although a number of studies have been conducted on the relationship between environmental 
management and firm performance, most of them are conducted in the Western context. Due to the 
unique social and economic environments in China, the performance implications of environmental 
management might be quite different in the Chinese context. We examine the impact of corporate 
environmental initiatives (CEIs) on the market value of firms in China. We find that, in contrast to the 
findings in the Western context, Chinese investors react negatively to CEI announcements. The 
negative reaction is more significant when the announcements are related to processes rather than 
products, and for state-owned enterprises rather than privately-owned corporations. However, there is 
no difference whether the CEI is self-declared or third-party endorsed. Overall, our research indicates 
that Chinese investors consider CEIs to be in conflict with shareholder interest. In particular, CEIs in 
state-owned enterprises might be considered by investors as signals that firms need to sacrifice profits 
to shoulder more social responsibility. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial implications of firms’ environmental practices have attracted researchers’ attention for 
years (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Lucas and Noordewier, 2016). Various studies have been 
conducted to address a simple yet important question: Does it pay to be green? (Dixon-Fowler et al., 
2013; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Stefan and Paul, 2008). A common approach employed to answer this 
question is the event study methodology, which quantifies stock market reactions to the 
announcements of corporate environmental initiatives (CEIs) (Gilley et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2010). 
While the event study results vary, some recent reviews observe that “it pays to be green” has become 
the predominant finding among studies (Endrikat, 2015; Molina-Azorín et al., 2009). However, these 
reviews also find that as prior studies have mainly focused on Western countries, especially in the US 
context, “further research on non-US firms is needed to assess whether the mainstream results are 
consistent with findings for other countries” (Blanco et al., 2009, p. 498). 
Such a concern is especially valid in the context of developing countries such as China, in which 
environmental regulations and customers’ preferences are quite different from those in the US and 
other Western countries (Economy and Lieberthal, 2007; Hsu et al., 2014; Marquis et al., 2011; Zhu, 
2015). As a result, it is questionable whether the predominant finding that “it pays to be green” still 
holds in the Chinese context. Moreover, while it is important to understand whether it pays to be 
green, recent reviews have pointed out that it is even more critical to explain when it pays to be green 
in order to provide more insightful implications for theory and practice (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013). 
Therefore, our research attempts to investigate whether and when it pays to be green in China.  
Conducting an event study of 556 CEI announcements of Chinese firms over a ten-year period 
2005 to 2014, we find that Chinese investors react negatively to CEI announcements. More 
specifically, over a two-day event window from the event day to the day after the event (i.e., days 0 to 
1), the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are -0.28% and -0.33%, respectively. 
Moreover, the CARs are statistically significant based on the t-test (p < 0.05) and Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (p < 0.01).  
We then adopt signalling theory to explore when it pays to be green in China. Signalling theory 
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suggests that in the situation of information asymmetry, one party may need to rely on some 
observable signals sent by another party to interpret the underlying capabilities of the latter (Connelly 
et al., 2011). Applying to our research context, the extent to which Chinese investors value CEIs may 
depends on how they view the observable signals contained in CEI announcements. Signalling theory 
thus enables us to hypothesize how the observable characteristics of CEIs and firms may send 
different signals to Chinese investors, resulting in different stock market reactions to firms’ CEI 
announcements. Consistent with our signalling logic, we find that the stock market reactions are more 
negative for process-focused (rather than product-focused) CEIs and state-owned (rather than 
privately-owned) firms. However, there is no difference in stock returns between self-declared and 
third-party certified CEIs. 
Our research is important in several ways. First, while the financial implications of CEIs have 
been well studied in the Western context (Gilley et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2010), little is known about 
how stock markets may react to Chinese firms’ CEI announcements. Our research fills this gap by 
documenting the CARs of 556 CEI announcements in China over a ten-year period 2005 to 2014. 
Moreover, the negative CARs found in our research challenge the pervasive claim that “it pays to be 
green” (Endrikat, 2015; Molina-Azorín et al., 2009) and highlight the importance of taking the 
national context into account when studying the financial implications of CEIs. 
In addition to the main effect, our research also documents how stock market reactions could vary 
across different CEIs and firms. These findings enable practitioners to gain a better understanding of 
not only whether but also when it pays to be green in China. Finally, the signalling perspective 
adopted in our research may offer a fruitful theoretical foundation for future research on CEIs. 
 
2. Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. CEIs and their impacts on financial performance  
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Gilley et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2010), we define CEIs as firms’ 
efforts to reduce the negative environmental impact or to enhance the positive environmental benefit 
of their products or processes. CEIs can be either process-focused, such as the implementation of 
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green manufacturing systems, or product-focused, such as the introduction of eco-friendly products 
(Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Christmann, 2000). On the other hand, firms can decide whether 
third-party verification or certification is involved in their CEIs (Jacobs et al., 2010). For instance, 
firms may implement environmental management systems with or without third-party certification 
(e.g., ISO 14001). 
The links between CEIs and financial performance have been well studied in the Western context 
(e.g., Gilley et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2010; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Wassmer et al., 2014). 
Prior studies on CEIs commonly agree that CEIs can help firms improve financial performance 
through two different mechanisms, namely cost reduction and revenue gain (Jacobs et al., 2010). First, 
CEIs are able to reduce costs because of the consumption of less energy and material, migration of 
environmental risks and crises, and avoidance of environmental lawsuits and legal settlements. On the 
other hand, CEIs enable firms to increase revenues by enhancing the loyalty of existing customers, 
attracting new and environmentally sensitive customers, and earning higher margins for eco-friendly 
products. These arguments have gained empirical support in the literature (see, e.g., Albertini, 2013; 
Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Molina-Azorín et al., 2009). In particular, a recent meta-analytic review 
shows positive relationships between CEIs and stock market reactions across prior studies (Endrikat, 
2015). 
Researchers increasingly adopt the event study methodology to investigate how Chinese investors 
react to various corporate events or initiatives such as mergers and acquisitions (Gaur et al., 2013), 
marketing channel expansions (Homburg et al., 2014), IT investments (Meng et al., 2007), and 
product recalls (Zhao et al., 2013). After an extensive search, we identify some related event studies 
concerning environmental management in China (e.g., Kong et al., 2014; Lyon et al., 2013; Xu et al., 
2012) and discuss how they are different from our research on Chinese firms’ environmental 
initiatives. For instance, Kong et al. (2014) studied the impact of an environmental policy (i.e., the 
carbon emission rights trading scheme (CERTS) announced on 29 October 2011), rather than 
corporate initiatives, on the market value of Chinese firms. On the other hand, Xu et al. (2012) 
investigated how stock markets react to Chinese firms’ environmental violation events, rather than 
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their environmental protection efforts. Finally, Lyon et al. (2013) examined stock market reactions to 
environmental awards initiated by a third-party in China (i.e., China Entrepreneur Club), rather than 
the environmental efforts initiated by Chinese firms themselves. Therefore, to the best of our 
knowledge, our research represents one of the first attempts to quantify stock market reactions to CEI 
announcements in China. 
On the other hand, due to the different environmental regulations and customers’ preferences in 
China (Economy and Lieberthal, 2007; Marquis et al., 2011), it is questionable whether the positive 
relationships between CEIs and stock market reactions found in Western countries (Endrikat, 2015) 
still hold in the Chinese context. Some prior event studies (e.g., Lyon et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2012), 
although different from our research, have raised the same concern. For instance, Lyon et al. (2013) 
found that winning environmental awards in China has no effect and, in some cases, even has a 
negative impact on shareholder value; Xu et al. (2012) revealed that environmental violation events 
have less negative effects on the market value of Chinese firms, compared with firms in other 
developed countries. Therefore, Chinese investors may not appreciate the cost reduction and revenue 
gain mechanisms of CEIs in China for various reasons.  
First, CEIs may not be regarded as an attractive option for Chinese firms to reduce cost. As the 
environmental regulations in China are less stringent compared with those in Western countries such 
as the US (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013), Chinese firms “find it cheaper simply to pay fines than to 
adhere to the regulations” (Economy and Lieberthal, 2007, p. 93). Moreover, competition for 
economic growth among different areas in China results in lax enforcement of the environmental 
regulations by local governments (Marquis et al., 2011), making it less likely to punish 
environmentally irresponsible but economically important firms. As a result, instead of reducing cost, 
CEIs may be viewed as costly investments for Chinese firms.  
On the other hand, Chinese firms may not benefit from CEIs in terms of revenue gain. Chinese 
customers are less environmentally aware compared with their counterparts in Western countries (Hsu 
et al., 2014). As a result, they may not view products’ environmental impacts as an important 
consideration in their buying decision process. Moreover, due to the significant differences in 
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individual incomes between China and Western countries (Malik, 2013), Chinese customers are more 
price-sensitive and thus may prefer products with lower prices rather than with better environmental 
performance. Given that the cost reduction and revenue gain mechanisms of CEIs may have opposite 
effects in Chinese firms compared with those in the Western economies, we expect negative, rather 
than positive, stock market reactions to CEI announcements of Chinese firms. Therefore, we propose 
that  
H1. Stock markets react negatively to Chinese firms’ CEI announcements.  
 
2.2. A signalling perspective on stock market reactions to CEIs in China  
Although we expect a negative impact of CEIs on shareholders’ value in the Chinese context, the 
magnitude of this impact may depend on the specific CEIs and firms concerned. Some recent reviews 
(e.g., Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Endrikat, 2015) have also urged researchers to move from simply 
answering ‘‘does it pay to be green?’’ to gaining a better understanding of ‘‘when does it pay to be 
green?’’ Accordingly, we adopt signalling theory to explore how the characteristics of CEIs and firms 
in China may send different signals to investors regarding the cost reduction and revenue gain 
opportunities of CEIs, thus resulting in different stock market reactions. 
Signalling theory applies to the situation of asymmetric distribution of information between two 
parties in which certain underlying capabilities of one party are unobservable to the other party 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Neto et al., 2016). In the case of CEIs in China, when a firm announces its 
CEI, the cost reduction and revenue gain capabilities of the CEI may be not easily observed by 
external investors. Signalling theory suggests that in this situation, the latter may need to rely on other 
observable characteristics of the former to interpret the former’s underlying capabilities (Gao et al., 
2010). As a result, investors may rely on other observable characteristics of the particular firm and 
CEI concerned to interpret the financial consequences of the firm’s CEI.  
We first consider how the focuses of firms’ CEIs may send different signals to investors, leading 
to different stock market reactions. Firms’ CEIs can be focused on either processes or products 
(Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Christmann, 2000): while process-focused CEIs centre on 
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operational processes such as manufacturing systems and logistics activities, product-focused CEIs 
concern the environmental impact of firms’ products and services (Gilley et al., 2000). Due to such a 
difference, prior studies suggest that firms implement process-focused CEIs to reduce cost whilst 
product-focused CEIs to increase revenue (Albertini, 2013; Christmann, 2000). In the context of 
China, investors may view process-focused CEIs as less effective compared with product-focused 
CEIs for several reasons. First, although the environmental regulations in China have become more 
stringent in recent years and some local governments have begun to redouble enforcement of 
regulations (Marquis et al., 2011), firms can move their processes to other areas with lax enforcement 
of regulations rather than to improve the environmental performance of their existing processes, 
making process-focused CEIs a less favourable choice for firms to reduce cost. On the other hand, as 
a result of improved environmental education and increased personal incomes of Chinese customers 
in recent years (Hays, 2014), some Chinese customers may be willing to pay more for and/or buy 
more eco-friendly products, benefiting firms with product-focused CEIs. Finally, because of their 
different focuses, process-focused CEIs are less visible to firms’ stakeholders compared with 
product-focused CEIs (Gilley et al., 2000). Signalling theory also emphasizes the importance of signal 
visibility because “signals that are more visible are more effective” (Connelly et al., 2011, p. 48). The 
invisibility of process-focused CEIs becomes even more prominent in the context of China where 
information is less transparent compared with in Western countries (Williams, 2015), thus making it 
difficult for investors to value the financial benefits of Chinese firms’ process-focused CEIs. 
Therefore, we propose that  
H2. The stock market reactions to Chinese firms’ CEI announcements are more negative when the 
CEIs are process-focused rather than product-focused. 
 
We then consider how the ownership of the announcing firms may signal different objectives of 
their CEIs, thus affecting stock market reactions. Compared with privately-owned firms, state-owned 
firms in China bear other political and social responsibilities beyond creating shareholder wealth 
(Chen et al., 2010; Cui and Jiang, 2012; Zhu et al., 2016). As a result, state-owned firms may not view 
 8 
 
CEIs as tools to reduce cost or to increase revenue, but as tasks assigned by the central or local 
government. For instance, Chongqing Iron and Steel Company Limited, a state-owned Chinese firm, 
relocated its factories in response to the local government’s environmental improvement policy, even 
though the relocation “caused the amount of liability increased and the finance costs rose sharply” 
(ET Net News Agency, 2015). On the other hand, privately-owned firms are more concerned about 
maximizing shareholders’ value (Friedman, 1970; Kramer, 2012). As a result, their CEIs, if 
implemented, are more likely to aim for creating shareholder wealth, through either cost reduction or 
revenue gain. Due to such a difference in the objectives of implementing CEIs, we expect that 
state-owned firms’ shareholders may benefit less from CEIs compared with those of privately-owned 
firms. Therefore, we propose that  
H3. The stock market reactions to Chinese firms’ CEI announcements are more negative when the 
firms are state-owned rather than privately-owned.  
 
Finally, we are interested in knowing whether third-party assessment or certification increases 
signal credibility, thus resulting in more favourable stock market reactions. While firms can 
implement CEIs with or without the involvement of independent third parties, prior studies (e.g., 
Cordeiro and Tewari, 2015; Jacobs et al., 2010; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996) argued that 
third-party assessment or certification, usually requiring detailed documentation, extensive 
examination, and objective evidence, conveys more creditable signals regarding firms’ CEIs, and thus 
are more likely to be valued by investors. Empirically, researchers have documented the positive 
financial impact of various types of third-party environmental certifications or awards such as the 
certification of environmental management systems (de Jong et al., 2014), environmental awards 
(Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996), and environmental rankings (Cordeiro and Tewari, 2015). The 
signalling effects of third-party certification may be particularly important in the context of China in 
which corporate information is less transparent (Williams, 2015). As a result, third-party certification 
may help reduce investors’ uncertainty about Chinese firms’ CEIs, thus leading to better stock market 
reactions. Therefore, we propose that 
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H4. The stock market reactions to Chinese firms’ CEI announcements are less negative when the 
CEIs are third-party certified rather than self-declared. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Data collection 
We collect and combine longitudinal data from multiple sources to construct our research variables. 
First, we obtained Chinese firms’ announcements of CEIs from a news database named WiseNews. 
WiseNews is the world’s largest Chinese news database, which covers more than 1,900 Chinese 
newspapers and magazines such as Shanghai Securities News, China Securities Journal, and 
Secutimes, and has been widely used in prior studies regarding China (e.g., Cheung et al., 2004; Du, 
2016). To provide a more comprehensive view of firms’ CEIs in China, we searched WiseNews in the 
ten-year period 2005 to 2014. Moreover, we limited our search to public firms that were included in 
the CSI 300 index from 2005 to 2014 for two reasons. First, the CSI 300 index consists of the 300 
largest and most liquid Chinese stocks that are widely covered by various news media, thus reducing 
the bias of news coverage. Second, the CSI 300 index can be used as the market return in the Market 
model discussed below, allowing a more precise estimation of sample firms’ abnormal returns upon 
their CEI announcements. Similar to prior CEI studies conducted in the Western context (e.g., Gilley 
et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2010), our search in WiseNews contained the names of the firms under 
study and the Chinese versions of the relevant keywords such as environment, green, ecosystem, 
recycle, and waste reduction. We read through the text of the searched results from WiseNews and 
excluded news articles that were (1) not directly related to CEIs such as public opinion on 
environmental issues and governments’ environmental policies, (2) concerned with firms that were 
not the constituents of the CSI 300 index, (3) duplicate reports of the same CEIs in different news 
media, or (4) confounded with other corporate events such as key executive appointments and annual 
earnings announcements. After elimination, we obtained 656 CEIs announced by 169 firms.  
We then obtained the daily stock returns of these sample firms from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database to analyze the stock market reactions to their CEI 
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announcements. The CSMAR database contains the stock return data of all the firms publicly traded 
in China since 1990, and has been widely used in prior event studies concerning Chinese firms (e.g., 
Calomiris et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2012). The CSMAR database also provides the ownership data of 
these public firms, which enable us to determine whether our sample firms are state-owned or 
privately-owned (Chen et al., 2010; Wang and Li, 2015). In addition, we relied on the news articles 
collected from WiseNews to determine whether the specific CEIs concerned were process-focused or 
product-focused, and whether they were third-party certified or self-declared. Table 1 summarizes the 
data sources of the key variables used in our research. 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
3.2. Event study methodology 
We employ the event study methodology (MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) to 
quantify stock market reactions to CEI announcements, which is known as abnormal returns (ARs). 
Basically, ARs are the differences between the actual stock returns with the occurrence of events such 
as CEI announcements and the expected stock returns had there been no such events. Following prior 
event studies (e.g., Jacobs et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2013), we estimate the expected stock returns 
based on the Market model shown in equation (1). Specifically, we first regress the stock returns (; 
the returns of firm i on day t) on the market returns (; the returns of the CSI 300 index on day t) 
over a 200-day estimation period ending 11 days prior to the CEI announcements (Jacobs et al., 
2010).  
																																																																							 =  + 	 + 
 	.																																																														(1) 
With the estimates  and 	 obtained from the estimation period, we calculate the expected 
stock returns (()) had there been no CEI announcements:  
																																																																									() =  + 		.																																																															(2) 
As a result, the abnormal returns () due to the CEI announcements can be computed as the 
difference between the actual stock returns () and the expected stock returns (()):  
																																																					 =  − () =  −  + 		.																																											(3) 
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Prior studies (e.g., MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) suggest calculating the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the event dates (i.e., over an event window) in order to 
capture the full impact of the event. Following prior event studies (e.g., Ba et al., 2013; Wassmer et 
al., 2014), we choose three trading days around the event dates (i.e., day -1 to +1) as the event 
window to account for possible information leakages before the event and possible announcements 
made after stock market closures. Our final sample for the event study reduces from 656 to 556 as the 
stock return data of some firms are not available in the 200-day estimation period or the three-day 
event window. Consistent with prior event studies (e.g., Gilley et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2010), we 
apply both parametric test (i.e., the t-test) and non-parametric test (i.e., the Wilcoxon-signed rank test) 
to analyze the statistical significance of ARs and CARs.  
 
3.3. Cross-sectional regression analysis 
Consistent with prior event studies (e.g., Ba et al., 2013; Flammer, 2013; MacKinlay, 1997), we 
construct a cross-sectional regression model as shown below to analyze how CARs may vary across 
different CEIs and firms. The use of regression enables us to control for other firm-, industry-, and 
time-specific factors that may be related to CARs.  
 = 	 + 	 - "# $		%$#&- "# $	' 
													+		()&*& - +, $		%-.*& /0- +, $	"-1													 
													+		23ℎ-$- %*&0	 &-"- $		 /"- $ /* $	' + 	56-1	)-7  
													+		86-1	"-&*9-/-&0 + 	:3-1 	3 ,$ + ',$#&0	;#11-  + 
 	.																											(4) 
CARs are based on the empirical findings from the event study that are able to “capture the 
significant effect of the event” (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997, p. 636). Consistent with prior CEI 
research (e.g., Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Christmann, 2000; Gilley et al., 2000), we code 
process-focused CEIs such as those reducing the use of hazardous materials in manufacturing 
processes and redesigning production systems to lower their environmental impact as 1, and 
product-focused CEIs such as those creating new types of environmentally-friendly products and 
reducing the environmental impact of existing products as 0. Following prior studies in the Chinese 
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context (e.g., Chen et al., 2010; Wang and Li, 2015), we regard a Chinese firm as state-owned if it is 
ultimately owned or controlled by the central or local government (coded as 1), and privately-owned 
otherwise (coded as 0). Finally, we code third-party certified CEIs such as environmental awards and 
certifications as 1, and self-declared CEIs as 0 (Jacobs et al., 2010).  
We control for firm size and firm profitability in the regression model as they may be related to 
CARs (Flammer, 2013; Gilley et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2010). We measure firm size as the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Flammer, 2013) and firm profitability as return on assets (Tang et al., 2016). 
We also include time trend and industry dummies to account for unobserved time and industry effects. 
Time trend is measured as the difference between a CEI’s announcing year and 2005 (Flammer, 
2013), while industry dummies are coded based on the industry classification compiled by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (Lo et al., 2010).  
 
4. Results 
4.1. The abnormal returns of CEIs 
The test results of abnormal returns are presented in Table 2. Panel A of Table 2 shows the abnormal 
returns on individual days around the CEI announcements (i.e., days -1, 0, and +1, respectively). 
Although the abnormal returns on day -1 are not statistically significant (p > 0.1 for both the t-test and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test), they become significant on both days 0 and +1 (p < 0.1 for the t-test and p 
< 0.01 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This suggests that there is no evidence of information 
leakage before CEI announcements but possible announcements made after stock market closures. 
Such a pattern of stock market reactions is consistent with prior research conducted in the Chinese 
context (e.g., Zhao et al., 2013). Moreover, the mean and median abnormal returns on both days 0 and 
+1 are negative, indicating that investors react negatively to CEI announcements of Chinese firms. 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) shown in Panel B of Table 2 provide further evidence. In 
particular, the mean and median CARs over both the two-day (i.e., days -1 to 0 and days 0 to +1) and 
three-day (i.e., days -1 to +1) event windows are negative, while both the t-test (p < 0.05) and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p < 0.01) are significant for the CARs from days 0 to +1. Therefore, H1 is 
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supported.  
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
4.2. Cross-sectional regression results 
As the stock market does not react significantly on day -1 (p > 0.1 for both the t-test and Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test), we rely on the CARs from days 0 to +1 as the dependent variable in our 
cross-sectional regression analysis. In fact, Panel B of Table 2 shows that the mean and median CARs 
from days 0 to +1 are more negative than those from days -1 to +1, suggesting that a two-day window 
(i.e., days 0 to +1) is “long enough to capture the significant effect of the event” (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997, p. 636).  
--- Table 3 about here --- 
--- Table 4 about here --- 
Table 3 shows the correlations among all the variables included in our regression analysis while 
Table 4 presents the regression results. In Table 4, Model 1 is the basic model including all the control 
variables and industry dummies. Models 2 to 4 add the three hypothesized variables, sequentially, to 
Model 1. All the four models are significant (F ≥ 1.594, p < 0.01) with adjusted R-squares ranging 
from 0.054 to 0.074. The number of observations in all the four models is 551, which is reduced from 
556 in Table 2 due to missing data for some control variables. 
Two control variables, namely firm profitability and time trend, remain significant (p < 0.1) 
across the four models. While firm profitability is negatively related to CARs, time trend is positively 
related to CARs. This suggests that investors react more negatively to CEIs announced by more 
profitable firms but react more positively to CEIs announced in recent years. The first hypothesized 
variable, process-focused or product-focused CEIs, is negative and significant (p < 0.05) from Models 
2 to 4, indicating that the abnormal returns are more negative when CEIs are process-focused rather 
than product-focused. Therefore, H2 is supported. Moreover, the second hypothesized variable, 
state-owned or privately-owned firms, is also negative and significant (p < 0.01) in Models 3 and 4. 
This shows that the stock market reacts more negatively to CEIs announced by state-owned rather 
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than privately-owned firms, supporting H3. The final hypothesized variable, third-party certified or 
self-declared CEIs, is positive but not statistically significant (p > 0.1) in Model 4, suggesting that 
there is no evidence that the abnormal returns of third-party certified CEIs are different from those of 
self-declared CEIs. Thus H4 is not supported.  
 
5. Discussion 
In this research we examine stock market reactions to CEIs in China. In contrast to the findings in the 
Western context, we find that Chinese investors react negatively to CEIs. In other words, unlike 
investors in Western countries, Chinese investors may believe that CEIs would lower the profitability 
of a firm, i.e., environmental initiatives and business objectives are likely to be in conflict. Previous 
research in the US suggests that CEIs lower the operational costs of firms, improving their 
productivity (see, e.g., Ba et al., 2013; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). Through CEIs, firms 
minimize waste, energy, and material consumption, and reduce environmental compliance costs 
(Jacobs et al., 2010). By channelling more resources to environmental management, firms can reduce 
overall operational expenses and improve their corporate images, leading to higher profitability. 
However, it seems that the same belief is not commonly shared among Chinese investors. Why do 
Chinese investors view firms’ environmental initiatives differently?  
Buyaert (2012) explained that Chinese stakeholders as a whole are less concerned about a firm’s 
activities related to corporate social responsibility. With fast economic development in the past 
decades, Chinese investors expect high growth rates in their invested firms and quick returns from 
their stock investments. The investment community does not encourage investments in compliance 
and socially responsible actions, which are considered as a long-term orientation for many Chinese 
stock investors. Also, the environmental laws, regulations, and requirements are in a state of flux 
within the country, and are often inconsistently enforced across regions (Zu and Song, 2009; Buyaert, 
2012). A firm’s long-term environmental orientation might be seen as a risky investment and might 
not lead to any short-term advantage to the firm. In fact, it has been observed that China’s fast 
economic growth has tended to stimulate risk-taking investments in the country (Li and Tang, 2010; 
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Buyaert, 2012). A firm’s environmental orientation, at such time of dramatic growth in the Chinese 
economy, is not viewed as attractive to stock investors. Furthermore, given that historically Chinese 
brands are under-developed and many successful Chinese firms are original equipment manufacturers, 
supporting brand building through environmental initiatives is considered as an even less attractive 
option to investors (Li et al., 2013).  
As our finding regarding the negative stock market reactions to CEI announcements contradicts 
the pervasive claim that “it pays to be green” (Endrikat, 2015; Molina-Azorín et al., 2009), one may 
question the robustness of our results, especially considering the relatively short event window (i.e., 
three days from days -1 to +1) adopted in our research. To address this concern, we conduct additional 
analyses on CARs over longer event windows to check the sensitivity of our finding. In particular, we 
calculate CARs over 5 days (days -2 to +2), 11 days (days -5 to +5), and 21 days (days -10 to +10), 
respectively, as shown in Table 5. The results show that the mean and median CARs remain negative 
in these three longer event windows. Moreover, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is statistically 
significant (p < 0.1) in all these three event windows. Therefore, these additional tests provide further 
support for our conclusion that investors react negatively to firms’ CEI announcements in China.  
--- Table 5 about here ---  
Although we find negative stock market reactions to Chinese firms’ CEI announcements, we do 
not encourage Chinese firms to behave in environmentally irresponsible ways. In fact, Chinese firms’ 
environmental violation events still have negative effects on their market value (Xu et al., 2012). 
Moreover, our regression results shown in Table 4 also suggest that stock markets react more 
positively to Chinese firms’ CEI announcements in recent years. Firms thus need to pay more 
attention to this changing behaviour of Chinese investors in recent years and should not exclude CEI 
investments from their future business plans.  
On the other hand, to encourage more Chinese firms to engage in CEIs, the Chinese government 
needs to further enhance the cost reduction and revenue gain mechanisms of CEIs in China, which in 
turn helps change the perception of Chinese investors about CEIs. For instance, the government 
should continue to redouble enforcement of regulations across different areas in China, encouraging 
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firms to improve environmental performance to reduce costs, rather than to avoid punishment by 
moving to other areas with lax enforcement of regulations. Similarly, the government should continue 
to increase the environmental awareness of Chinese consumers and stimulate green consumption, thus 
benefiting environmentally responsible firms in terms of revenue gain. We believe that once the cost 
reduction and revenue gain mechanisms of CEIs become clear in China, investors will favour Chinese 
firms’ CEI investments.  
Furthermore, consistent with the finding in the Western context, we find that Chinese investors 
react relatively more positively (or less negatively) to product-focused initiatives as compared with 
process-focused initiatives. This shows that, to a certain extent, Chinese investors recognize the 
reputational effect of environmental concerns through products, but not processes. Gilley et al.’s 
(2000) study in the US suggested that investors respond more positively to product-focused CEIs due 
to the reputational effect. They explained that process-focused CEIs have little effect on enhancing a 
firm’s goodwill with stakeholders as consumers often pay scant attention to firms’ operations. They 
maintained that the “potential reputation enhancing benefits of process-driven initiatives are not 
realized, translating into a negative reaction” (Gilley et al., 2000, p. 1210). Accordingly, it seems that 
Chinese firms can move strategically to implement product-focused CEIs in order to increase 
shareholders’ value.  
Also, consistent with the finding of Jacobs et al.’s (2010) study in the US, we find no significant 
difference in market reaction to self-declared and third-party certified CEIs. In the Chinese context, 
the stock market does not positively react even if such CEIs are externally endorsed (e.g., ISO 14001 
or environmental awards bestowed by the government organizations). The results reinforce our 
argument that Chinese investors have less concern for corporate environmental activities, even if such 
efforts are verified externally.  
Unique to the Chinese context, we find that investors react more negatively to CEIs in 
state-owned enterprises, as compared with privately-owned corporations. Li and Foo (2015) found 
that the quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting has a much stronger effect in 
lowering the capital cost for privately-owned firms. In contrast, the quality of CSR reports, either 
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voluntary or mandatory, has no effect on the capital cost for state-owned enterprises. State-owned 
enterprises, which are backed up by the Chinese government, are considered as less risky investments 
in the stock market. As state-owned enterprises are often protected by the government, mitigating firm 
risks through environmental initiatives is considered as less attractive. On the other hand, private 
firms in the Chinese stock market are often controlled by proprietors with diverse backgrounds, 
making the signalling effect of CEIs relatively important (Li and Foo, 2015).  
In China, state-owned enterprises consume more resources from society, including easy access to 
capital, government subsidies, and policy advantages (Cheung et al., 2015). Nevertheless, state-owned 
enterprises are also under greater pressure to practise CSR and shoulder environmental 
responsibilities (Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). In fact, state-owned corporations in China are not 
only viewed as business enterprises, they are considered as a government authority of the country’s 
economic and social stability (Li and Foo, 2015). For privately-owned firms, engaging in CEIs or 
CSR activities can be a way for developing positive corporate images and building political 
connections with the government, which in turn enhances their public images and reputations in the 
investment community. However, being state-owned, there is no need to develop government 
connections through CEIs as all their senior executives are government officials (Cheung et al., 2015). 
As privately-owned firms are disadvantaged in the marketplace, CEIs are relatively more relevant in 
building legitimacy, reputation, and confidence in investors (Qian et al., 2015). The stock market thus 
reacts less negatively to CEIs in private firms.  
For state-owned enterprises, social and environmental duties are an accepted part of their 
corporate responsibility. Qian et al. (2015) maintained that much of the social and environmental 
responsibilities are concentrated in the state-owned enterprises in China. For CEIs in state-owned 
enterprises, investors would be doubtful that “too much social responsibility could disadvantage firms 
economically” (Zu and Song, 2009, p. 109). Environmental initiatives in state-owned firms would 
probably be considered as a signal that firms need to sacrifice profits to shoulder social burdens as 
dictated by the government (Cheung et al., 2015). Historically, state-owned enterprises have been 
bearing various social responsibilities as required by the government, making profit-making a second 
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priority. For example, state-owned enterprises often have a larger than required workforce to stabilize 
the job market, absorb price fluctuations, and lower product prices to curb inflation during economic 
upturns (see, e.g., Markoczy et al., 2013).  
In recent years, the Chinese society, including the media and the public, is increasingly aware of 
the importance of environmental management. We believe that our findings bear some important 
policy implications. In particular, to motivate firms to take up more environmental responsibilities, it 
is important to align CEIs with a firm’s interest. Such an alignment might involve changing the 
prevalent view (or at least in the stock market) that environmental protection and a firm’s interest are 
in conflict. This will also rely on government policy to ensure that environmentally-friendly firms are 
economically advantaged. In this process, the change in the mindset of investors, consumers, and 
other stakeholders of firms are very important. With internationalization of Chinese enterprises and 
increasing concern for environmental issues in the country, we believe that there will be some positive 
changes in this regard for years to come. However, the current scenario does require the attention of 
both the government and the business community.  
Finally, the signalling perspective adopted in our research may offer a fruitful theoretical 
foundation for future research on CEIs. Signalling theory is suitable for studying CEIs because of the 
opaque nature of environmental management (Wijen, 2014). In other words, it is not clear whether a 
CEI, when announced, can benefit the announcing firm financially. In this situation, investors need to 
rely on other observable signals to interpret the financial consequences of the announced CEI. The 
signalling perspective is particularly useful in the context of China in which information is more 
opaque and entities are less accountable (Williams, 2015). Drawing upon signalling theory, 
researchers can study other interesting questions beyond those addressed in our research. For instance, 
while our research focuses on investors’ reactions to the signals sent by firms announcing CEIs, future 
research can explore how other stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, and competitors interpret 
and respond to firms’ CEI signals. On the other hand, in addition to the characteristics of firms and 
CEIs investigated in our research, researchers can examine how the signalling environment in China 
may moderate stakeholders’ reactions to CEIs. For example, stakeholders may react quite differently 
 19 
 
to CEIs announced in more polluted areas or industries. Overall, we encourage researchers to adopt 
the signalling perspective to enrich our understanding of CEIs in general and the Chinese context in 
particular.   
 
6. Conclusions and Limitations 
Consistent with the findings in the Western context, environmental initiatives in the business 
community in China might be economically motivated rather than morally driven (Zu and Song, 
2009). However, in the Western context, investors often consider CEIs as an opportunity to streamline 
operations, reduce waste, and improve corporate image. However, as reflected by the negative stock 
reactions, Chinese investors view CEIs differently in that they believe environmental initiatives by 
firms might be in conflict with shareholder interests. Such a conflict is more pronounced when firms 
pursue process-based CEIs, which has little reputational effect. It is also more serious in state-owned 
enterprises, which have traditionally been taking on more social responsibility as dictated by the 
government. Investors might consider CEIs in state-owned enterprises as signals that firms need to 
sacrifice profits to shoulder more social responsibility.  
There are some limitations in our research. First, we consider market reactions to CEIs generally 
across all industrial sectors. It is possible that market reactions to some technologically breakthroughs 
in environment-related sectors might be different. For example, in recent years, the Chinese 
government has encouraged the development of electric vehicles and the market is very likely to react 
positively to technology development in such an industry. Also, our research focuses on social 
responsibility for environmental-related issues, rather than environmental technology that is critical to 
a particular industry (see, e.g., Ba et al., 2013). Second, as China is undergoing rapid economic, 
social, and technological development, it is possible that the mindsets of consumers and investors will 
change in the near future. However, our findings should reflect the scenario in China during a period 
of fast economic development over the past decade. We believe that, by studying stock market 
reactions to CEIs, we can better understand the perceived values of CEIs in the investment 
community. This will enable researchers and practitioners to gain a better understanding of the market 
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values of CEIs, providing important implications for operations management and policy formulation.  
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Table 1  
Key variable descriptions. 
Variable  Description Measurement Data Source Reference 
Process-focused 
or 
product-focused 
CEIs 
Whether the CEIs are 
process-focused or 
product-focused.  
Process-focused CEIs = 1; 
Product-focused CEIs = 0. 
WiseNews Gilley et al. 
(2000), Jacobs 
et al. (2010). 
State-owned or 
privately-owned 
firms 
Whether the firms are 
state-owned or 
privately-owned.   
State-owned firms = 1; 
Privately-owned firms = 0.  
CSMAR  Chen et al. 
(2010), Wang 
and Li (2015).  
Third-party 
certified or 
self-declared 
CEIs 
Whether the CEIs are 
third-party certified or 
self-declared. 
Third-party certified CEIs = 
1; Self-declared CEIs = 0. 
WiseNews Jacobs et al. 
(2010), Klassen 
and McLaughlin 
(1996). 
Firm Size Size of the announcing 
firms. 
ln(Total Assets) CSMAR Flammer 
(2013), Jacobs 
(2014). 
Firm 
Profitability 
Profitability of the 
announcing firms.   
Return on Assets (ROA) CSMAR Flammer 
(2013), Tang et 
al. (2016). 
Time Trend When the CEIs are 
announced. 
Year of CEI announcements 
- 2005   
WiseNews Flammer 
(2013), Melnyk 
et al. (2003). 
Industry 
Dummies 
Industry of the 
announcing firms. 
Binary coding based on the 
industry classification 
compiled by the China 
Securities Regulatory 
Commission.  
CSMAR Li et al. (2011), 
Lo et al. (2010). 
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Table 2  
Test results of abnormal returns. 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
Day N Mean ARs Median ARs t-test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
-1 556 0.07% -0.15% 0.784 -0.791 
0 556 -0.13% -0.17% -1.516* -2.608*** 
+1 556 -0.15% -0.23% -1.570* -3.060*** 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
Days N Mean CARs Median CARs t-test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
-1, 0 556 -0.06% -0.23% -0.457 -1.516* 
0, +1 556 -0.28% -0.33% -2.068** -2.998*** 
-1, +1 556 -0.21% -0.31% -1.221 -1.983** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (one-tailed tests).   
 
  
 29 
 
Table 3  
Correlation matrix. 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. CARs 1 
      
2. Firm Size 0.038 1 
     
3. Firm Profitability -0.074* -0.150*** 1 
    
4. Time Trend 0.073* 0.472*** 0.005 1 
   
5. Process-focused or 
product-focused CEIs -0.132*** -0.131*** 0.145*** -0.098** 1   
6. State-owned or 
privately-owned firms -0.133*** -0.072* 0.091** -0.368*** 0.306*** 1  
7. Third-party certified or 
self-declared CEIs 0.066 -0.130*** 0.015 0.001 -0.126*** -0.091** 1 
Mean -0.284 24.692 0.111 4.093 -0.374 0.236 0.151 
Standard Deviation 3.192 2.103 0.152 2.499 0.484 0.425 0.358 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 4  
Cross-sectional regression results. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 5.111 (1.373) 
6.032 
(1.619) 
5.141 
(1.381) 
5.171 
(1.390) 
Firm Size -0.252 (-1.581) 
-0.293* 
(-1.838) 
-0.219 
(-1.357) 
-0.224 
(-1.387) 
Firm Profitability -2.055* (-1.818) 
-1.958* 
(-1.740) 
-1.938* 
(-1.731) 
-1.917* 
(-1.713) 
Time Trend 0.198*** (2.771) 
0.209*** 
(2.924) 
0.132* 
(1.719) 
0.135* 
(1.755) 
Process-focused or 
product-focused CEIs  
-0.839*** 
(-2.357) 
-0.728** 
(-2.040) 
-0.705** 
(-1.974) 
State-owned or 
privately-owned firms   
-1.070*** 
(-2.549) 
1.063*** 
(-2.533) 
Third-party certified or 
self-declared CEIs    
0.510 
(1.224) 
     
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Number of Observations (N) 551 551 551 551 
R-square 0.145 0.155 0.166 0.168 
Adjusted R-square 0.054 0.063 0.073 0.074 
F-value 1.594*** 1.681*** 1.787*** 1.784*** 
Notes: 
1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests for control variables and one-tailed tests for 
hypothesized variables). 
2. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
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Table 5  
Cumulative abnormal returns over longer event windows. 
Days N Mean CARs Median CARs t-test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
-2, -2 549 -0.27% -0.22% -1.183 -1.284* 
-5, +5 498 -0.77% -0.38% -2.291** -2.073** 
-10, +10 446 -1.14% -0.57% -2.206** -1.775** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 (one-tailed tests).  
